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Chief, RB

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Operational/CART/CADSBY

CADRAIN/CART Relationship

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CADRAIN

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B. SFRAN-3647  
C. DFR-32918  
D. SFRAN-2664  
E. EGRA-11485  
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1. Recent developments in both the CADRAIN and CARBOHYDRATE cases highlight the need for a current evaluation of the basic CART responsibility for CADRAIN operations in order to clarify the precise limitations of the informal but real security responsibility which BOB/CART now exercises with respect to the conduct of CADRAIN projects.

2. Given the fact that this phase of BOB/CART's function has at best been ill-defined and adumbrated in the past, it is also felt equally desirable to delineate the precise functions of the CART section in its future relations with CADRAIN.

a. Subsequent to the revelation of CARBOHYDRATE's <sup>A</sup>Secret connection, reference "C" above recommended that CARBOHYDRATE be turned over to the exclusive control of the CADRAIN/CADSBY case officer, pointing out certain advantages which would accrue to the more efficient operation and increased security of CADSBY thereby.

b. It is concomitantly true that there exist certain fallacies in the CART/CARBOHYDRATE relationship which make a change to exclusive CADRAIN control of CARBOHYDRATE desirable from several points of view:

Approved by: \_\_\_\_\_

11 March 1954

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- (1) The equivocal position of CARBONMATE with himself certainly detracts from the efficient accomplishment of his assigned duties in the CAGMOT organization, since regrettably certain members of the CAGMOT staff look upon him as a control mechanism employed to pry into their conduct of CAGMOT affairs.
- (2) At the same time, CARBONMATE has on occasion found himself in receipt of specific instructions from his case officers which have then been countermanded by his CAGMOT superiors.
- (3) It is further noted that the absence at operational meetings of the CAGMOT/CAGMOT case officer requires an exchange of paper, and in some cases a definite lapse before appropriate remedial action can be taken. The CAGMOT case officer must first prepare a contact report, and then an inter-office memorandum to make certain that latent issues become a matter of the written record.
- (4) Moreover the CAGMOT case officer cannot be fully cognizant of all aspects of CAGMOT operations, so that in some cases he is not qualified to make specific recommendations concerning points which CARBONMATE raises; this is, of course, particularly true when the CAGMOT/CAGMOT case officer is detained by other duties.

c. It is therefore the intention of SCS/CAGMOT, in accord with references "C", "D", and "E" above, to deliver CARBONMATE to exclusive CAGMOT control, as soon as the practical mechanics of this change can be worked out.

d. Once CARBONMATE has become the exclusive charge of CAGMOT, it is clear that a further re-examination of the CAGMOT/CAGMOT program is in order for a number of cogent reasons:

- (1) The removal of CARBONMATE from direct CAGMOT control in effect removes the last vestige of direct insight into CAGMOT operations, and constitutes a change from the previous remote and ineffectual intervention of CAGMOT in the daily conduct of CAGMOT affairs.
- (2) The recent appraisal of the CAGMOT mission and its fulfillment by SCS have led to the inescapable conclusion that a concerted effort must be made towards the accomplishment of the primary function of CAGMOT as an aggressive weapon against the RLB and the SCS.

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To this end, it becomes clear that in its more passive CANT functions (the investigation of flaps, the staff function of preparing general recommendations in the field of operational security, etc.) a considerable reduction must be made; hereafter no direct intervention in the daily conduct of BOB operations in general as opposed to specific cases as the need arises is feasible or desirable if the aggressive CANT effort is to have a minimal chance of success.

- (3) It is equally obvious that the acute shortage of CANT case officers makes it even more insupportable upon the section to assign its qualified personnel to the contemplated aggressive operations against the KGB and the SFR. By the same token, however, it is precisely the qualified CANT case officer who should exercise those staff functions of a CANT nature which concern other BOB and CANTAIN operations. In order to resolve the apparent paradox presented by this situation, it is presently contemplated that the new function of operational security officer under the BOB Operations Officer, will in time be incorporated into the BOB organization to exercise precisely that continuous scrutiny of the daily conduct of all BOB operations.
- (h) In the daily operational conduct of CANTAIN operations, it is further not reasonable to expect that the minutiae associated therewith should become the subject of correspondence between BOB/CANT and CANTAIN. The latter undoubtedly realizes that any attempt by CANT to intrude upon the operating level of CANTAIN operations would be catastrophic to all concerned; therefore, such a course of action must for practical reasons be excluded a priori.
- (5) In the light of the equivocal situation which is currently in the process of resolution, it is practically impossible for any CANT case officer to remain fully conversant with the multiple phases of CANTAIN operations, nor is it further desirable for him to belabor the CANTAIN case officers for operational details which in essence do not constitute an integral part of his present function as "security officer" for the projects concerned. Clearly then, a more precise formulation of this security responsibility is indispensable to the continued function of BOB/CANT in an

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advisory capacity, and to the further maintenance of available, efficient and timely coordination of GAB/ART activities with the GART section, where appropriate.

a. Given the varied factors which constitute an impressive weight of evidence to support the contention that a close re-examination of GART functions is in order, the following paragraphs will attempt to set forth the future GAB/ART - GART relationship as it is presently being evolved.

5. First and foremost, following the transfer of GAB/ART staff, the position of GAB/ART must become analogous to that of the military staff: it can conduct only general supervision of going operations and offer its comments and recommendations thereon when matters of interest to GART appear. Further, when the specific need arises, direct intervention by GART on an ad hoc basis may be required, yet such an involvement in the operational details of any project must be considered an emergency and purely transitory measure to be employed solely in extreme cases; and only in those cases where the opposition service has clearly appeared as a matter of purely GART interest or as a security threat to the operation at hand, as opposed to simple intervention to enforce operational security practices.

b. In view of the decreased yet more realistic and effective role which the GAB/ART section will play in the future conduct of GAB/ART operations, a number of possible solutions are set forth for the conduct of the daily GART (in the generic sense of the word) supervision of GAB/ART projects:

a. Basically, the responsibility for the operational security of any project must rest squarely on the shoulders of the case officer concerned. This principle means simply that each case officer must be expected to manage his projects with a reasonable and average sense of operational security, and make the basic decisions affecting it which are required by the daily requirements of his operations. A further point which militates in favor of this principle is the fact that most GAB/ART case officers have at least as much, if not more, experience than the large majority of the junior GART case officers, and are thereby as well equipped to exercise this security function personally. This general rule not only applies to, but is the fact concerning every other operational section at GAB.

b. Ultimately, however, it may be possible to incorporate a trained GART officer into the structure of GAB/ART who will be in a position to exercise this function in a much more detailed manner if that is considered necessary. No real in this respect, however, that insufficient grounds exist for special GART treatment to GAB/ART operations over any other GAB operation.

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a. Within the near future, however, the position of operational security officer within the BOB organization will become a reality, and it is precisely this senior member of the staff who will bear the responsibility for all BOB operations which CAST has in a general way exercised with respect to the conduct of T-2822 projects in the past.

5. The implementation of these new arrangements for BOB operational security will find the position of BOB/CAST to be as follows:

a. The primary efforts of BOB/CAST will be devoted to its aggressive penetration efforts against the SIS, RIF and the SCS, and all other functions will of necessity be subordinate to this basic mission and effort.

b. In spite of the preclusive nature of this future orientation and direction of the BOB effort, it should be stated that the section still stands ready to offer general recommendations commensurate with its secondary role in a staff advisory capacity. Such a function would of necessity be on broad, general CAST matters, leaving the immediate resolution of daily operational problems to the appropriate case officer. This generally is the position which BOB/CAST occupies with respect to other segments of BOB, and this is the only manner in which BOB can do justice to its overall mission.

c. Further, where emergencies do arise requiring the direct intervention of the CAST section in an active operation, then the group stands ready to contribute substantially of its time and efforts to the immediate resolution of a temporary crisis, always with the understanding that the CAST section will revert at the earliest opportunity to its primary functions and advisory capacity as soon as circumstances permit.

6. As for the present, however, pending the establishment and activation of a BOB operational security officer, the immediate change we are now implementing as far as BOB/CAST relations are concerned is two fold:

a. Transfer of CAST/BOB/CAST to CAST/BOB case officer.

b. Relegation of all other BOB/CAST matters concerning this limited field, as it CAST/BOB, WILLING, CAST/BOB, to same position occupied by BOB/CAST, BOB/CAST, BOB/CAST and BOB/CAST in relation to BOB/CAST.

c. An internal BOB/CAST memorandum will record the actual mechanics necessary for the fulfillment of the changes outlined herein.

7. We are convinced that such changes not only will not lessen the effectiveness of CAST/BOB relations heretofore maintained, but will represent a distinct improvement in the fields of personnel relations, KUBARK amalgamation, and BOB/CAST efficiency.

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